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The Riegle-Neal Act in the US and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe are
recent initiatives to stimulate …nancial integration. These initiatives allow new entrants
to “poach” the incumbents’ clients by o¤ering them attractive loan o¤ers. We show that
these deregulations may be insu¢cient since asymmetric information seriously hampers
the integration of credit markets. This asymmetry stems from the informational advan-
tage incumbent banks have about their current clients vis-à-vis potential entrants. More-
over, banks may strategically display some information hindering entry when asymmetric
information is moderate. We also show that voluntary information sharing emerges only
when asymmetric information is low.
JEL: D43, L13, G21
Keywords: …nancial integration; banking competition; asymmetric information; bar-
riers to entry.1 Introduction
Recent history shows substantial deregulatory initiatives to realize …nancial integration
in the United States and Europe. In the US, Congress passed in 1994 the Riegle-Neal In-
terstate and Branching E¢ciency Act allowing the creation of region-wide or nation-wide
banks. The implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union since 1999 illustrates
the continuation of …nancial integration in Europe (see e.g. Neven (1992) for details on
the regulatory reform in the European Community). However, Danthine et al. (1999)
report that cross-border banking activity in Europe remains limited whereas the success
of interstate consolidation in the US stems mainly from diversi…cation gains. Our paper
points at asymmetric information as a possible cause for this low level of banking market
integration. In particular we study the relationship between competition, entry, and dis-
play of information in credit markets. The role of displaying borrowers’ credit histories
on competition between banks started to receive some attention in the recent literature
(see e.g. Klein (1992), Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000),
and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2000)). Also in the credit market, it has been shown that
adverse selection can be an e¤ective informational barrier to entry (see e.g. Broecker
(1990), Dell’Ariccia et al. 1999, Gehrig (1998), and Marquez (2000)). Yet, the e¤ect of
communicating information between banks on competition and entry has so far not yet
been studied. The implementation of the Riegle-Neal act on interstate banking in the
US and the ongoing …nancial integration in Europe call for a deeper understanding of
such an important topic.
Our model looks at interest rate competition between lenders. We start from a pro-
tected market to capture historical market segmentation and study entry, if any, when
markets open up for competition. Banks compete for borrowers who can be either high
or low ability entrepreneurs. Every incumbent bank knows the borrowers’ characteristics
on its own market. We allow banks to price discriminate between their current and new
borrowers. That is, banks can target their rivals’ borrowers and o¤er them a signi…cant
interest rate discount. The discount may make some of the rival’s borrowers switch to
the targeting bank. In other words, we allow banks to engage in “poaching” activities.
We show that entry takes place when banks unilaterally provide their rivals with
information about their borrowers’ types. This display of “full” information removes
1informational based barriers to entry. As a consequence, borrower poaching always oc-
curs. In contrast, incumbent banks may retain a monopoly when they do not display
information. This happens when adverse selection is su¢ciently harsh. In other words,
borrower poaching becomes a loss-making activity whenever the proportion of low ability
borrowers is signi…cant. If the proportion of low ability borrowers is moderate, however,
entry takes place. Poached borrowers enjoy a lower interest rate when the “average”
borrower incurs a switching cost. Otherwise, the entering bank sets a higher interest rate
than the incumbent.
When there is a small cost associated with information display, we …nd that full
information display never arises endogenously. However a bank may have an individ-
ual incentive to strategically display information about project outcomes, or “partial”
information. The incumbent bank then reduces the rival’s scale of entry. Banks may
also mutually agree to exchange information, that is “share” information. Endogenous
full information sharing results whenever entry occurs, or when asymmetric information
is not too important. Otherwise, full information sharing happens when the …xed cost
savings from entry outweigh the increased competition in the incumbent’s …rst-period
market. Partial information sharing takes place if entry deterrence for unsuccessful high
ability borrowers is credible. Full information display is socially optimal when the av-
erage borrower enjoys a switching gain. Banks may also optimally reduce the scale of
entry when they communicate partial information. This happens when entry would take
place without information sharing and borrowers incur switching costs. Finally, without
information display and absent entry, welfare is maximized where there are switching
costs.
This paper adds to the literature on informational barriers to entry in the following
respects. Dell’Ariccia (1998) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) use the incumbent-entrant
set-up to demonstrate the important consequences of adverse selection on entry possi-
bilities. In these models, incumbent or “inside” banks enjoy informational advantages
over potentially entering lenders. This advantage occurs because of existing relationships
with their current borrowers applying for another unit of credit. They show that entry is
already blockaded by two incumbent banks. Our paper also focuses on adverse selection
as a barrier to entry in the credit market. However, we analyze a symmetric situation
where banks enjoy a local monopoly position in the …rst period of the game. Each bank,
2therefore, has an incumbency position as a result of historical market segmentation. The
second period of the game, then, looks at the role of informational barriers to entry. Our
results indicate that banks will prevent entry in their incumbent market when adverse
selection is su¢ciently harsh. Moreover we also show that banks will enter if asymmetric
information becomes su¢ciently moderate. Marquez (2000) …nds that speci…c skills in
processing new borrowers ease entry. We show that the type of displayed information
between banks may fundamentally determine entry.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on information sharing in the credit
market. Information sharing between banks often occurs through credit registers. Some
registers mainly collect information about default behavior. This is referred to as “black”
information. Other registers only report information about outstanding loans. The reg-
istration of outstanding loans is known as “white” information. Jappelli and Pagano
(1999) o¤er an extensive and detailed overview of existing credit registers in an interna-
tional perspective. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) look at the role of information exchange
between banks in an adverse selection model. Banks have information about residen-
tial borrowers but not about immigrant borrowers. That is, an exogenous in‡ow of new
borrowers produces adverse selection because of asymmetric information about borrow-
ers’ types. The adverse selection problem, then, disappears when banks decide to pool
information about their local borrowers. As a result, the default rate decreases. Our
paper, in contrast, looks at the role of information exchange between banks when they
consider entering their rival’s market. Thus, our paper focuses on endogenous in‡ow of
new borrowers. In two other papers Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000) look at the e¤ects
of information sharing on banking competition when moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion arise. In their papers, endogenous information sharing stems from a reduction in
moral hazard. In our paper, display of partial information prevents the rival bank from
poaching part of the high ability borrowers. Finally, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2000) show
that information sharing may act as a collusive device: a reduction in future informa-
tional rents dampens current competition. Our model, in contrast, studies banks’ pricing
behavior when markets open up for competition.
Customer poaching has been analyzed by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).1 In a two-
period model without asymmetric information, they study equilibrium based brand
1See also Sha¤er and Zhang (2000).
3switching. Their results show that prices decrease over time since poaching is always
optimal. Our results corroborate theirs only when asymmetric information is not too
harsh. However, when asymmetric information is severe, equilibrium poaching is no
longer observed. von Thadden (1998) analyzes a model of corporate borrowing under
asymmetric information. He shows that in equilibrium switching of both good and bad
borrowers occurs. Our paper con…rms this result. However, we …nd that switching be-
havior crucially depends on the nature of the information sharing mechanism. First,
low ability borrowers switch only without information display and entry. Second, high
ability poached borrowers also switch when there is full information display. Finally,
poached borrowers pay lower interest rates where there are switching costs. Chen (1997)
studies the practice of o¤ering discounts to new customers in markets with switching
costs. Price discrimination between old and new customers ultimately yields a prisoners’
dilemma situation and generates costly equilibrium switching of consumers. Our paper
con…rms this socially ine¢cient switching in the presence of switching costs.2 In con-
trast, our paper starts from historically segmented markets. Moreover it incorporates
asymmetric information and shows that entry does not always take place.
There is empirical evidence about the importance of adverse selection and the mag-
nitude of borrower switching behavior. Sha¤er (1998) presents evidence on the winner’s
curse in banking in the US. In particular, she …nds that de novo banks experience sub-
stantially higher loan chargeo¤ rates during their third through ninth year. Farinha
and Santos (2000) report that some Portuguese …rms switch banks. The European con-
text shows however that borrower switching is becoming an increasingly important issue.
Mortgage borrowers in Europe are increasingly searching for lending possibilities across
the borders. Countries like Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Austria, and Por-
tugal are currently taking actions to coordinate the exchange of information about their
resident borrowers. In a related context, Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2000) provide
evidence about …rms switching underwriters. In particular, they show that in the mid-
1990s about 30% of …rms completing a seasoned equity o¤ering within three years of
their initial public o¤ering switched lead underwriter.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model. The analysis
2Klemperer (1995) reviews the literature on markets with switching costs. In this literature, no
equilibrium switching takes place.
4takes place in Section 3. Endogenous display of information is discussed in Section 4.
Information sharing is considered in Section 5 and welfare comparisons are made in
Section 6. Section 7 contains a discussion of our results. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a market where bank A has a protected monopoly in period one. Its total
market size is normalized to one. At the beginning of period two the market opens up for
competition. Bank A’s …rst-period borrowers incur zero visiting costs when they remain
with their bank in period two. However, …rst-period borrowers incur switching costs in
the action of visiting an entering bank B. The switching costs of bank A’s …rst-period
borrowers are uniformly distributed on [s;s]: In what follows we restrict the parameters
of the model to satisfy the assumptions that s > 2s and s > 0: That is, the borrowers
di¤er su¢ciently in terms of switching costs. Moreover, at least some borrowers have
positive switching costs. We do not exclude that some borrowers may enjoy “gains” from
switching. For instance, borrowers living close to a state-border may prefer to be served
in another state. Borrowers are risk-neutral and demand at most one unit of credit per
period with one bank. Credit applications with several banks within the same period are
too costly for borrowers. This assumption prevents borrowers from applying with two
banks per period.
There are two types of borrowers: a proportion 0 · ¹ · 1 of high ability borrowers
executing projects that succeed with probability 0 · ¼ · 1. A project returns q if
successful and 0 in case of failure. We assume that q is large enough so that in equilibrium
both banks want to serve all high ability credit applicants and every borrower wants to
apply for credit. The remaining proportion 1 ¡ ¹ contains low ability borrowers. These
borrowers execute unsuccessful projects with certainty.3 They apply for credit whenever
possible since they enjoy non-pecuniary private bene…ts from having access to a credit
line. That is, low ability borrowers always default and are insensitive with respect to the
interest rates. We assume that the non-pecuniary bene…ts from getting one unit of credit
3Alternatively, low ability borrowers cannot identify successful projects. Or, they never execute a
project since they have such a large marginal disutility of e¤ort (see Padilla and Pagano (2000)). This
assumption could be relaxed as long as the expected return on low ability borrowers is negative. This
does not qualitatively a¤ect our results.
5su¢ciently compensate for the associated switching costs low ability borrowers make.
Both types of borrowers are uniformly distributed on [s;s]. Each borrower consumes
the revenues of his successful projects at the end of every period.4 In the event of an
unsuccessful project, the lender forgives the borrower’s debt at the end of the current
period.5 Consequently, every borrower’s initial wealth is zero at the beginning of every
period.6 The bank’s cost of funding per project equals R0 ¸ 1:
The situation in period one is exogenously given. Since we are interested in the e¤ects
of the opening up of markets we will not explicitly model this …rst period. We assume
that bank A enjoys a local monopoly, charges the monopoly price, and serves its whole
market. Moreover, the conditions are such that the monopolist makes pro…ts. Bank A
has no information about the borrowers’ preferences and characteristics at the beginning
of the …rst period. However, it enjoys an incumbency advantage in the second period
from serving its customers on its …rst-period monopoly market. At the end of this period
bank A privately observes whether a borrower executed a successful project or defaulted.
At the end of the …rst period the incumbent bank A also discovers its own borrowers’
types: high or low ability. This assumption captures the notion of “relationship banking”
(Rajan (1992)). For example, banks, in contrast with arm’s length …nanciers, observe
whether the entrepreneur invested in assets or not. Summarizing, we assume that output
and type are privately observable.
When the market opens up for competition, the entering bank can engage in “poach-
ing” the incumbent’s …rst-period borrowers. We are interested in the competitive and
welfare e¤ects of three cases. The …rst analyzes the case where banks fully display the
types of their …rst-period customers. The second treats the opposite case where banks do
not engage in information display about their customers. Finally, there is the interme-
diary case where banks only communicate information about project outcomes. We will
call this “partial” information display. The displayed information only contains “hard”
4Alternatively, the remaining output of a successful project cannot be stored (see Padilla and Pagano
(2000)).
5An alternative interpretation is that the proceeds of only the executed project in the current period
serve as a claim for the lender’s loan.
6We assume that borrowers have no incentives to strategically hide their type. Thus low ability
borrowers have no incentive to strategically behave as high ability borrowers in the …rst period and
behave as low ability types in period two. Similarly, high ability types have no incentives to behave as


































Figure 1: The timing of the game.
data such as detailed repayment schemes or audit reports. In addition we assume that if
information about project outcomes or types is publicly displayed, it is veri…able. This
assumption guarantees truthful revelation of information. We allow banks to enter the
market for successful entrepreneurs only or for all types of entrepreneurs. Where pos-
sible, banks can discriminate between types of borrowers and between successful and
unsuccessful borrowers. Banks may endogenize the institutional setting. Alternatively,
the informational environment can be exogenously given, for instance via regulation.
The timing of the game is as follows and its main components are illustrated in Figure
1. Nature chooses borrowers’ types in the beginning of period one. Bank A charges
the monopoly interest rate to all borrowers. The incumbent bank observes the project
outcomes and its borrowers’ types. At the start of period two, bank A’s market opens
up for competition. Bank A displays some information about its …rst-period borrowers
or not. Bank B decides whether to enter or not. Banks simultaneously set interest rates
when entry takes place. Absent entry, the incumbent bank charges the monopoly interest
rate. Finally, Nature chooses the outcome of each project.
3 Analysis
We will show that for each case discussed there exists a range where bank B has an
incentive to poach some of bank A’s …rst-period borrowers. The di¤erent settings about
7information display will alter these poaching incentives. In what follows, we solve for the
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the model outlined in Section 2 for each informa-
tional setting. Since the outcome of the …rst stage equals the monopoly price for bank
A, we only solve for the second period of the game. Bank A o¤ers an interest rate R
to its high ability …rst-period borrowers. If bank B does not enter, it has zero pro…ts.
Bank A then enjoys a local monopoly and will set R = q and its second-period pro…ts
become ¹(¼q ¡R0). If bank B enters, it o¤ers an interest rate ½ to bank A’s …rst-period
borrowers. Since bank A knows …rst-period borrowers’ types, it will not o¤er loans to its
…rst-period low ability borrowers.
This Section discusses bank B’s decision about entry. Section 3.1 starts with full
information display. Afterwards we turn to the no and partial information display settings
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
3.1 Full information display
3.1.1 Demand Analysis
A high ability borrower in the second period is indi¤erent between continuing her rela-
tionship at bank A and switching relationship to bank B if her switching cost s is such
that
¼R = ¼½ + s:
Borrowers with a switching cost higher than s continue their relationship with bank A.
In contrast, borrowers with a switching cost lower than s switch to bank B. Bank A’s










0 if (¼½ + s)=¼ < R
¹a if (¼½ + s)=¼ · R · (¼½ + s)=¼
¹ otherwise.
(1)
8The …rst part of Eq. (1) shows that for high enough R, bank A does not attract any
of the high ability borrowers. Part two displays that for intermediate values of bank
A’s interest rate, some of the high ability borrowers switch bank whereas others continue
their relationship in the second period. Finally, part three presents that where an interest
rate R is su¢ciently low, bank B is not able to poach high ability borrowers.
3.1.2 Best-response analysis
Bank A displays information about borrower types at the beginning of the second period.
As a result both banks are completely informed in the second period about all borrowers’
types. Low ability borrowers are denied access to the credit market in the second period.
Since all high ability borrowers have independent and identical probabilities of success
they are equally valuable to both banks. Consequently, bank A’s pro…t equals
¦
f
A(R;½) ´ DA[¼R ¡ R0] (2)
where the superscript f refers to full information display and DA ´ DA(R;½). The right-
hand side of Eq. (2) refers to bank A’s pro…t from its “loyal” high ability borrowers.
That is, the borrowers with the highest switching costs stay with bank A. Similarly, bank
B’s pro…t from poaching bank A’s …rst-period customers becomes
¦
f
B(R;½) ´ (¹ ¡ DA)[¼½ ¡ R0]: (3)






R0=¼ if (R0 ¡ s)=¼ > ½
(R0 + s + ¼½)=2¼ if (R0 ¡ s)=¼ · ½ · (R0 + s ¡ 2s)=¼
(¼½ + s)=¼ otherwise.
(4)





R0=¼ if (R0 + s)=¼ > R
(R0 ¡ s + ¼R)=2¼ if (R0 + s)=¼ · R · (R0 + 2s ¡ s)=¼
(¼R ¡ s)=¼ otherwise.
: (5)
9As pro…t functions are quasi-concave, Eqs. (4) and (5) yield the following unique solution
R =
3R0 + 2s ¡ s
3¼
;½ =
3R0 + s ¡ 2s
3¼
: (6)




















Notice that our assumptions ensure that both banks enjoy a positive market share and
are able to set an interest rate above the actuarially fair interest rate R0=¼:
3.1.3 Entry or no entry
Bank B will enter as long as its pro…ts of entering are non-negative. That is, entry occurs
whenever ¦
f
B ¸ 0: This condition is always guaranteed since we assumed that s > 2s.
The results for full information display are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Display of full information always results in entry. Poached borrowers
receive a lower loan rate when the “average” switching cost is positive. Otherwise, the
entering bank is able to charge a higher interest rate since borrowers have on average a
higher “preference” for that bank.
In conclusion, with full information display, entry always occurs since all informational
barriers to entry disappear. Competition between banks though remains imperfect be-
cause borrowers are heterogeneous with respect to switching costs. The relative interest
rates charged by both banks depends on the average switching costs or gains. If, on
average, borrowers have a positive switching cost (s + s ¸ 0) the incumbent bank has
more market power than the entrant. That is, borrowers have on average a preference for
the incumbent bank. Of course, this happens when all borrowers incur positive switching
costs. However, when the average borrower has a preference for the entrant bank, that
bank has more market power than the incumbent bank. This happens when on average
borrowers enjoy a switching gain (s + s < 0).
103.2 No information display
In this setting, bank A does not display information. Thus bank B has neither informa-
tion on project outcomes nor on borrower types. This severely impacts its opportunities
to poach bank A’s …rst-period borrowers. Low ability borrowers optimally switch banks
as their type is revealed to bank A. This contrasts with full information display where
low ability borrowers are denied access to the credit market.
The analysis is similar to full information display if bank B has entered the market.
The demand analysis for high ability borrowers coincides exactly. Low ability borrowers
turn to bank B. Summarizing, bank A’s pro…ts can be written as
¦
n




B(R;½) ´ (¹ ¡ DA)[¼½ ¡ R0] ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)R0
for bank B. The superscript n refers to no information display. Thus the low ability bor-
rowers enter the poaching bank’s pro…t as a …xed cost. This di¤ers from full information
display where the entering bank B recognizes low ability borrowers. The best-responses
mimic those of full information display and the equilibrium interest rates are as in Eq.
(6) since …xed costs do not in‡uence the pricing behavior of both banks. The pro…ts can











¡ (1 ¡ ¹)R0: (10)
Bank B’s pro…ts are lower compared to full information display. The intuition is that
bank B faces an adverse selection problem as it serves all low ability entrepreneurs.




9R0(s ¡ s) + (s ¡ 2s)2: (11)
The results for no information display are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 When bank A does not display information, bank B enters if adverse
selection is not too harsh, i.e. if ¹ > ¹¤: Otherwise, bank B does not enter and bank
11A enjoys a monopoly. The critical level ¹¤ above which bank B enters decreases in the
highest switching cost and increases in the lowest switching cost. Thus markets with
“loyal” borrowers are less prone to entry.
Bank B will enter as long as its expected pro…ts are positive. That is, if ¦n
B > 0
or ¹ > ¹¤. Otherwise B will not enter leaving bank A a monopoly. The impact from
changes in maximum and minimum switching costs can be gauged from @¹¤=@s < 0 and
@¹¤=@s > 0: The incumbent bank prices less aggressively if some borrowers become more
attached to the incumbent bank. This raises bank B’s pro…ts inducing entry even with
more adverse selection problems.
The next subsection describes the results for display of partial information.
3.3 Partial information display
A bank may also display information about project outcomes. This stands in contrast
with full information display where a bank reports borrowers’ types. Information about
project outcomes, or “partial” information thus only reveals whether a project was suc-
cessful or not. In our model, information about defaulters or “black” information coin-
cides with partial information.7
Partial information display, then, has two important properties. First, banks know
whether a credit applicant was successful or not. Consequently, the possibility to poach
the rival’s successful high ability borrowers occurs just like with full information display.
Second, poaching of unsuccessful high ability borrowers is much more severe. The …xed
cost from low ability entrepreneurs must now be covered by the gains from unsuccessful
high ability entrepreneurs only. In other words display of partial information eases the
poaching of successful borrowers. The informational barrier to entry for unsuccessful
borrowers however has increased with partial information display since they are pooled
with low ability borrowers. Bank A may now price discriminate between borrowers of its
own …rst-period market: successful and unsuccessful high ability borrowers. The reason
is that the successful borrowers can always be poached separately whereas the second
pool is poached together with the low ability borrowers. It will turn out that bank A
7In our model, “white” information equals no information display; with debtforgiveness at the end of
the …rst period, there are no outstanding loans in the next period.
12may o¤er two di¤erent interest rates: (i) an interest rate to all high ability borrowers
or successful high ability borrowers only, and (ii) a monopoly rate to unsuccessful high
ability borrowers.
We will assume that bank B can opt to enter for successful high ability borrowers
only (“small-size” entry), or to enter for all borrowers (“large-size” entry). The analy-
sis of entry for successful high ability borrowers coincides with full information display.
Poaching successful high ability borrowers is always pro…table as project outcomes are
displayed. Therefore small-size entry takes place for any degree of asymmetric informa-
tion. Consequently we concentrate our analysis to “large-size” entry for all borrower
types.
Denote by ½u and Ru bank B’s poaching interest rate for borrowers with unsuccessful
project outcomes and bank A’s interest rate for unsuccessful high ability borrowers,
respectively. The analysis resembles the one with full information display. The pro…ts




A (¢) ´ (1 ¡ ¼)DA(¼Ru ¡ R0) (12)
for bank A and
£
pu
B (¢) ´ (1 ¡ ¼)(¹ ¡ DA)[¼½u ¡ R0] ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)R0; (13)
for bank B, respectively. The superscripts p and u refer to partial information display
and unsuccessful high ability borrowers, respectively. Moreover we use £
pu
i (¢) to denote
pro…ts from unsuccessful borrowers only, with i = A;B.
The best-response functions, interest rates and market shares coincide with full in-
formation sharing. The intuition is that unsuccessful high ability borrowers behave in
exactly the same way and are as pro…table as successful high ability borrowers. The









¹(1 ¡ ¼)(s ¡ 2s)2
9(s ¡ s)
¡ (1 ¡ ¹)R0: (14)
Bank B’s pro…ts on successful high ability borrowers are positive if revenues from
these borrowers cover the losses from low ability borrowers. Bank B’s pro…ts decrease
13in the success probability ¼. That is less high ability borrowers have to make up for the
low ability borrowers.








R0 + s + 2
p
R0¹(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¼)(s ¡ s)
¼
: (16)
Moreover assume that bank B can commit to enter for successful high ability borrowers
only. We summarize our main …ndings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 When bank A displays partial information, small-size entry always oc-
curs. Full-size entry only happens if adverse selection is not too important, i.e. if ¹ > ¹¤¤:
Otherwise, bank A enjoys a monopoly for unsuccessful high ability borrowers. Finally
¹¤¤ > ¹¤.
Bank B considers large-size entry if its expected pro…ts are positive. This happens
when £
pu
B > 0 or equivalently ¹ > ¹¤¤. Otherwise there is small-size entry leaving bank
A a monopoly for unsuccessful high ability borrowers. Comparison of Eqs. (11) and (15)
learns that ¹¤¤ > ¹¤. The intuition is that low ability borrowers enter as a …xed cost.
Large size entry hinges on revenues £
pu
B accruing from unsuccessful high ability borrowers
only. Consequently the critical proportion ¹¤¤ generating non-negative revenues must be
higher than ¹¤. The impact from changes in the highest and lowest switching cost can
again be seen from @¹¤¤=@s < 0 and @¹¤¤=@s > 0.
In the previous discussion, we assumed that bank B can commit to only “small-size”
entry. However, this may not be credible. This happens if the monopoly price q set by
the incumbent bank for the unsuccessful high ability borrowers is higher than q¤. The
critical value q¤ is bank A’s equilibrium interest rate R if ¹ = ¹¤¤. For all values of q · q¤
the maximum pro…t from also serving unsuccessful high ability borrowers are negative
due to attracting low ability borrowers. In the remainder of this paper, we assume that
q · q¤ so that commitment is credible. Furthermore, commitment may also be credible
when it is su¢ciently costly for the entering bank to substitute “large-size” for “small-
size” entry. For instance, installing a screening technology may be a costly exercise. If
14q > q¤, bank A anticipates that bank B will enter with “large-size” scale, i.e. for all
borrowers and the information on project outcomes will not be used.
4 Endogenous Display of Information
Padilla and Pagano (1997) endogenize information communication among lenders pro-
ducing a trade o¤ between two forces. First, information communication diminishes
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers. This disciplines borrowers and
therefore reduces moral hazard and adverse selection. Second, this reduction in asym-
metric information enhances competition. The net e¤ect of these two forces determines
whether banks will spontaneously distribute their private information to their competi-
tors. Our framework also allows us to endogenize information display. That is bank A
decides on full, partial, or no information display. Proposition 4 summarizes our results.
Proposition 4 Bank A will not display information if adverse selection is harsh (¹ <
¹¤). For intermediate degrees of adverse selection (¹¤ · ¹ · ¹¤¤) bank A endogenously
provides bank B with partial information if q · q¤. Otherwise, bank A’s pro…ts do not
hinge on (the degree of) information display.
The …rst part of proposition 4 states that bank A does not want to provide information
about borrowers’ types or project outcomes if ¹ < ¹¤. This action would encourage entry
and lower bank A’s pro…ts. The intuition is that an entering bank no longer faces barriers
to entry since information about types or project outcomes is revealed. Proposition 4
however shows that endogenous display of partial information arises for strategic reasons
if ¹¤ · ¹ · ¹¤¤ and q · q¤. Display of partial information does not a¤ect bank A’s
pro…ts from successful high ability borrowers. The intuition is that bank B will always
target this group of borrowers at the same interest rate. Since the cost of entry from low
ability borrowers remains constant, partial information display prevents bank B from
pro…tably poaching unsuccessful high ability borrowers. The incumbent bank therefore
maximizes its pro…ts by displaying information about project outcomes. This prevents
the rival bank from poaching bank A’s unsuccessful high ability borrowers. Finally, if
adverse selection is su¢ciently low (¹¤¤ < ¹) or intermediate (¹¤ · ¹ · ¹¤¤ together with
q > q¤) bank B enters irrespective of its information about borrowers. In other words
15if the display of partial or full information is costless bank A’s pro…ts are not altered.
Otherwise, bank A strictly prefers to retain the information about its borrowers.
Thus our model explains that bank A can only decrease its pro…ts by showing infor-
mation about borrowers’ types. Moreover, when adverse selection is moderate bank A
can increase its pro…ts by strategically displaying partial information.
Our results complement Padilla and Pagano’s (1997) …ndings. In their paper, en-
dogenous information transmission results from a reduction in moral hazard. Without
moral hazard, communicating information is unambiguously pro…t reducing. Our model
explains partial information display in equilibrium without moral hazard. The driving
force is that the communication of partial information prevents the entering bank from
poaching unsuccessful high ability borrowers.
5 Information Sharing
Our analysis sofar exclusively focused on entry of bank B into bank A’s …rst-period
market. Consequently, display of information was one-way. When both banks’ markets
open up for competition, information communication can be two-way. This section will
therefore also consider the case where bank A enters bank B’s …rst-period market and
deals with the role of information sharing between banks when two segmented markets
open up for competition. We de…ne information sharing between banks as a situation
where all banks mutually agree to exchange information for free about their borrowers’
types or project outcomes. Empirical evidence shows that information exchange between
banks is based on the principle of reciprocity. That is, access to information about
borrowers is only available to suppliers of such information. Typically, the access price
is fairly small (see Padilla and Pagano (1997), and Jappelli and Pagano (1999)). We
capture this empirical regularity by assuming free access.
The purpose of this section is …rst to discuss when endogenous information sharing
between banks will arise. Afterwards we turn to the analysis where information sharing
is imposed. That is information sharing is exogenous.
Denote by ¹i the degree of adverse selection in market i with i = A;B. The next
Proposition summarizes the main …ndings for endogenous information sharing.
Proposition 5 Suppose banks’ …rst-period markets face a similar degree of adverse se-
16lection. Full information sharing only takes place if adverse selection in all markets is
low. Partial information sharing results for intermediate adverse selection. Otherwise
no information sharing will occur. When adverse selection di¤ers substantially between
markets, full information sharing takes place if the cost of entry from low ability bor-
rowers in B’s market outweighs the reduction in pro…ts from increased competition in its
own market.
The …rst part of Proposition 5 considers the case where every ¹i belongs to the same
segment of the interval. Suppose …rst that ¹i · ¹¤. Although both banks prefer to receive
information about the rival’s …rst-period market, information sharing will not take place.
The reason is that both banks loose their monopoly pro…ts when sharing information.
Second, consider ¹¤ < ¹i < ¹¤¤. Partial information sharing results when q · q¤.
Proposition 3 shows that it is not optimal to provide the rival bank with information
about borrower types. However, every bank individually pro…ts from communicating
information about project outcomes. Therefore partial information sharing will occur.
When q > q¤ large-size entry occurs in both markets. Anticipating entry in their own
market each bank prevents low ability borrowers from entering its customer base when
sharing information about borrowers’ types. Finally when ¹i ¸ ¹¤¤ we are back in the
previous case where banks’ pro…ts in their home market are not a¤ected when sharing
information. Full information sharing endogenously happens as this eliminates adverse
selection.
The second part of Proposition 5 describes the situations where adverse selection
di¤ers substantially between markets. Suppose that ¹A · ¹¤ and ¹B ¸ ¹¤¤. Bank B
bene…ts from an information sharing agreement: A’s market can be pro…tably entered and
B’s pro…ts on its incumbent market remain una¤ected. Bank A however only engages in
full information sharing when the cost of entry from low ability borrowers in B’s market
outweighs the reduction in pro…ts from increased competition in its own market. This is
more likely the larger country B and the smaller country A. Otherwise no information
sharing results.
Consider the case where ¹¤ < ¹A < ¹¤¤ and ¹B ¸ ¹¤¤. Suppose q · q¤. Again bank
B is willing to step into full information sharing: it generates additional pro…ts in bank
A’s …rst-period market. Bank A wants to fully share information if eliminating adverse
17selection in bank B’s market outweighs the reduction in pro…ts from unsuccessful high
ability borrowers in its incumbent market. Otherwise, bank A displays partial informa-
tion and bank B keeps its information private. If q > q¤ full information sharing results.
Banks’ pro…ts in their home market are not a¤ected when sharing information. Full
information sharing endogenously happens as this eliminates adverse selection problems.
Finally, ¹A · ¹¤ and ¹¤ < ¹B < ¹¤¤. First suppose q · q¤. Partial information
sharing is pro…t reducing for bank A. Full information sharing induces entry in both
markets. Banks only consider to fully share information if the gains from entering the
rival’s market outweigh the losses in the incumbent market. This condition cannot be
satis…ed simultaneously for both banks. Thus display of partial information by bank
B results. If q > q¤ bank B prefers full information sharing. Bank A only steps into
full information sharing if the reduction in pro…ts in its incumbent market outweighs
the losses from low ability borrowers in B’s market. Otherwise no information sharing
results.
Next to endogenous information sharing, governments or supranational bodies may
exogenously regulate information sharing. This does not necessarily imply that banks use
the information freely made available by other banks. First consider the case of exogenous
full information sharing. Banks will always use this information since it reveals borrower
types allowing adverse selection problems to disappear. Consequently, large-size entry
happens. Second, consider the case of partial information sharing. This allows banks to
always poach successful high ability borrowers. However, suppose bank B wants to enter
bank A’s …rst-period market and ¹¤ < ¹A < ¹¤¤ and q > q¤. Then, bank B enters A’s
market for both successful and unsuccessful high ability borrowers. Therefore, bank B
enters as a large sized bank and neglects the information provided on project outcomes.
6 Welfare Analysis
Two forces drive the results of our welfare analysis. The …rst force refers to credit
access. Display of full information denies credit to low ability borrowers. Partial and
no information display with full-size entry however do not block loans to low ability
borrowers. With or without small-size entry, low ability borrowers do not obtain a loan
in the second period. High ability borrowers always enjoy credit access.
18The second force refers to switching costs or bene…ts. Poaching is socially ine¢cient
when all poached borrowers incur switching costs. This event happens when s > 0.
However when some borrowers enjoy switching gains, some poached borrowers switch to
their most preferred bank. If the average borrower enjoys switching gains, all poached
borrowers switch to their most preferred bank.
No information display without entry improves on full information when all borrowers
incur switching costs. High ability borrowers stick to their …rst-period bank. Moreover
since no entry happens, low ability borrowers are denied credit. Entry however reverses
this result since low ability borrowers switch bank. From a welfare point of view bank A
may optimally deter entry by displaying partial information. This happens when entry
would take place without information display and when borrowers incur switching costs.
We summarize the main welfare insights in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 No information display without entry unambiguously maximizes welfare
when borrowers incur switching costs. Full information sharing maximizes welfare when
the average borrower enjoys a switching gain. Bank A optimally displays partial infor-
mation when this prevents entry from taking place and when borrowers incur switching
costs.
7 Discussion
This section discusses and relaxes some of the main assumptions, and illustrates the
robustness of our results.
We considered binary choices of information display between banks. That is all in-
formation about project outcomes is revealed or not, or all information about borrower
types is displayed or not. However, one can imagine situations where banks may truth-
fully display only part of project outcomes or part of borrower types. In other words
banks could control the degree of partial or full information display. Revealing only part
of the information might be a pro…t maximizing strategy. Partial information display
o¤ers a speci…c example of such a strategy: displaying only a proportion of its borrow-
ers’ types, the incumbent bank strategically deters entry for its unsuccessful high ability
borrowers.
19In our analysis, it is assumed that entry precedes price competition. Padilla and
Pagano (1997, 2000) discuss a Stackelberg setting in a model without switching costs
or other frictions. In particular, two banks compete sequentially in interest rates with
the incumbent bank as leader. Two remarks are warranted. First, our results remain
qualitatively the same when adopting this approach. In the Stackelberg setting, the in-
cumbent bank prices aggressively to deter entry. Moreover, strategic display of partial
information also may appear as a pro…t maximizing strategy for the incumbent bank to
protect its unsuccessful high ability borrowers from being poached. Second, competition
with simultaneous interest rate setting may be more appropriate. The Stackelberg as-
sumption has the inherent credibility problem of prices as a commitment variable. This
credibility problem is not present in our model.
Information display happens in our model at no cost. In other words, information is
displayed for strategic reasons. In addition, information might be sold to the rival at a
certain price. Information sharing is a speci…c example of this. Information is revealed in
exchange for information about your rivals’ borrower base. On top of sharing information,
there are clearly opportunities to unilaterally sell information. Consider …rst the cases
where large-size entry occurs. That is, ¹A ¸ ¹¤¤ and ¹¤ < ¹A < ¹¤¤ together with q > q¤.
Bank B then has a willingness to pay for “full” information equal to the losses caused
by low ability borrowers. A Nash-bargaining outcome might divide the available surplus.
All other cases cannot lead to gains from trade since total duopoly pro…ts never exceed
the incumbent’s monopoly surplus.
Firms often enjoy the option to choose between bank lending or arm’s length …nancing
in the …rst period. This …nancing choice determines the information obtained by the …rst-
period lenders. In particular, banks may observe the borrower’s type over the course of
their relation. On the contrary, only the project outcome may be publicly available with
arm’s length …nance. In choosing arm’s length …nance in the …rst period, high ability
…rms face the risk of being denied credit in the second period if unsuccessful since they
may be pooled with low ability entrepreneurs. In an environment where banks observe
borrower types in a credible way, building up a relationship is a mechanism to avoid the
risk of being denied credit in the second period. This result compares to Diamond (1991).
He shows that if moral hazard is su¢ciently widespread …rms build up a reputation by
being monitored via bank lending. In our model however high ability entrepreneurs opt
20for bank lending to avoid the possibility of being pooled with low ability entrepreneurs
in the next period. Accordingly, adverse selection drives the result.
8 Conclusions
The opening up of historically segmented banking and …nancial markets in the United
States and Europe is assumed to drastically impact both economies. Our analysis con-
siders potential consequences of opening up banking markets in a model where we allow
for price discrimination and borrower poaching. A particular ingredient of banking com-
petition concerns asymmetric information between banks about borrowers’ types and
project outcomes. Banks enjoy an informational incumbency advantage with respect to
their current borrowers’ characteristics. We analyze opening up of markets and consider
endogenous information display. The provision of full information eliminates informa-
tional barriers to entry. In other words, entry occurs and some borrowers switch their
bank-…rm relationship. No information display poses an adverse selection problem and
severely hampers poaching behavior. Partial information display generates quite di¤erent
implications for successful borrowers versus unsuccessful borrowers. Successful borrowers
are spotted and are able to switch banks in a similar fashion as with full information
sharing. Unsuccessful high ability and low ability borrowers are pooled and thus face
most di¢culties in switching banks.
Banks have no incentives to individually display full information. Display of project
outcomes however may strategically arise when adverse selection is not too important.
Partial information display then results in a monopoly on unsuccessful high ability bor-
rowers and increases informational rents. A mutual agreement between banks to exchange
information about borrowers somehow modi…es the results. Partial information sharing
still arises when adverse selection is moderate. However, full information sharing between
banks endogenously happens in situations where adverse selection is mild. This strate-
gic view on information display provides an additional explanation for the existence of
private credit bureaus.
From a welfare point of view we …nd that no information display without entry un-
ambiguously maximizes welfare when borrowers incur switching costs. High ability bor-
rowers stick to their …rst-period bank. Moreover the absence of entry denies low ability
21borrowers access to the credit market. From a policy perspective, we …nd that infor-
mation sharing aimed at stimulating competition may take place at a cost: switching
towards a less preferred bank is clearly ine¢cient. Full information sharing maximizes
welfare when the average borrower shows a switching gain.
This paper shows that asymmetric information may severely reduce poaching possi-
bilities. In line with the existing literature we …nd that poaching behavior results when
adverse selection problems are mild. In contrast, no entry may result when adverse selec-
tion problems are considerable. Thus adverse selection dampens poaching behavior. The
opening up of …nancial markets may be insu¢cient for borrowers to switch. In particular
adverse selection may be too harsh to induce entry. Borrower switching then calls for
actions that dampen asymmetric information. Full information sharing may serve this
purpose.
Danthine et al. (1999) show that diversi…cation gains may stimulate banking market
integration. Our model explains that entry only takes place when asymmetric information
is not too important. Thus, we o¤er a complementary argument at explaining the degree
of cross-border banking activity.
Asymmetric information is an important ingredient of …nancial markets. Poaching be-
havior in an asymmetric information environment however also applies to other markets.
Insurance markets are a …rst example. Insurance companies may enter new markets at
the risk of selecting the most risky consumers. Information sharing in insurance markets
then becomes an important issue. Labor markets are yet another example. Employ-
ers hiring new employees face the risk of attracting “bad employees.” Adverse selection
then may be dampened by systems like letters of reference or good conduct and morals
certi…cates.
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